

**A Written Interview with Peter S. Williams (MA, MPhil, PGCert),
author of *A Universe From Someone: Essays on Natural Theology* (Wipf & Stock, 2022)**

Norwegian theologian Asbjørn Berland of BioCosmos Norway (<https://biocosmos.no/>) invited me to respond to some questions about natural theology in writing. The resulting Q&A document, below, formed the basis for a series of more journalistic interview pieces on the BioCosmos website.

1. What is natural theology, and why should “ordinary people” care?

Natural theology is the philosophical discipline that pursues the question of whether or not there are good arguments for “theism” (that is, the belief that God exists), where a good argument would be a set of premises that are jointly more plausibly true than false, and from which a conclusion follows with logical validity that adds something to the case for God’s existence.

There’s a far broader array of arguments for God than most people realise. The noted American philosopher Alvin Plantinga famously once gave a lecture on “Two Dozen (Or So) Arguments for God.”¹ I think a good many arguments for God are defensible, and that they are best seen as mutually-reinforcing strands in a cumulative case where different arguments bring different (though perhaps overlapping) pieces of information to the table with respect to our understanding of God’s nature. In general, arguments for theism try to rationally motivate recognition of various relationships between particular aspects of the cosmos and God, where each relationship tells us something about God (so there’s a close relationship between “natural theology” and the exploration of God’s nature in “philosophical theology”).

I’d make two additional points about natural theology. First, what Oxford University philosopher Richard Swinburne calls “ramified” – that is, “expanded” - natural theology highlights the fact that so-called “Christian evidences” traditionally considered within the theological discipline of Christian apologetics (e.g. historically grounded arguments for and from fulfilled Biblical prophecy,² Jesus’ Divine self-understanding,³ the case for Jesus’ resurrection,⁴ etc.) don’t merely build upon and round out the philosophical case for God with reasons to believe in the *Christian* God, but can also work as part of the cumulative philosophical argument for theism.

Second, as atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel reminds us: “Philosophy has to proceed comparatively.”⁵ On the one hand, this means the cumulative case for God must be balanced against the cumulative case for each alternative worldview. On the other hand, this means the positive case for God is reinforced by whatever negative case can be made against non-theistic worldviews.⁶ I think there are plenty of good reasons, quite besides the positive arguments for theism, to be deeply skeptical about the viability of non-theistic worldviews such as pantheism and metaphysical naturalism.⁷

Leaving aside the intimation that philosophers might not be “ordinary” people (!), why should folks “care” about natural theology? Philosophy is about the wise pursuit and dissemination of true answers to significant questions through the practice of good intellectual habits. People should care about the wise pursuit and dissemination of a true answer the question of God’s existence, because, as Mortimer J. Adler affirmed: “More consequences for thought and action follow the affirmation or denial of God than from answering any other basic question.”⁸

Every fully functioning human being has a “way of life” that aims to integrate their “head” (including their worldview *assumptions* about reality), their “heart” (the *attitudes* they have or take towards what they assume to be true of reality) and their “hands” (the *actions* that grow out of the pairing of their assumptions with their attitudes). What is sometimes

called “the God question” concerns the nature of fundamental reality, and is directly connected to fundamental questions about the nature, meaning and purpose of the cosmos in general, and human existence in particular. Consequently, “the God question” is of deeply practical existential significance.

2. You write that a renaissance has occurred in natural theology. Why has this happened?

Natural Philosophy became unfashionable between the early nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, due to a scepticism about metaphysics that was tied to a philosophically naive overemphasis upon empirical evidence being the only source of knowledge about reality (scientism), or even the litmus test of meaningful statements about reality beyond those that are true simply by definition (i.e. logical positivism). However, this scepticism soon began to crumble, and had basically collapsed in philosophical circles by the 1970’s. As William Lane Craig explains:

Back in the 1940s and ‘50s, many philosophers believed that talk about God, since it is not verifiable by the five senses, is meaningless . . . This verificationism finally collapsed, in part because philosophers realized that verificationism itself could not be verified! The collapse of verificationism was the most important philosophical event of the 20th century. Its downfall meant that philosophers were free once again to tackle traditional problems of philosophy that verificationism had suppressed. Accompanying this resurgence of interest in traditional philosophical questions came something altogether unanticipated: a renaissance of Christian philosophy.

The turning point probably came in 1967, with the publication of Alvin Plantinga’s *God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God*. In Plantinga’s train has followed a host of Christian philosophers, writing in scholarly journals and participating in professional conferences and publishing with the finest academic presses . . .

The renaissance of Christian philosophy has been accompanied by a resurgence of interest in natural theology . . . all of the traditional arguments for God’s existence, not to mention creative new arguments, find articulate defenders today.⁹

Ironically, it was a series of scientific discoveries that re-ignited much of this renewed interest in natural theology.¹⁰ Since the 1950’s, biologists have uncovered highly complex information processing systems and intricate molecular machinery in cells that have revived discussions about design in both the biological sciences and natural theology. In cosmology, a series of developments beginning in the 1920’s and culminating in the 1960’s established the “Big Bang” theory of a cosmic beginning, sidelining the ancient pagan belief that the cosmos exists eternally and rejuvenating discussion of *kalam*-type cosmological arguments. Moreover, cosmologists have recognised a life-permitting “fine tuning” of the laws, constants and initial conditions of cosmos that has added to the debate about design.

As an aside, its important to note that bridging the obvious gap between a scientific conclusion of “intelligent design” and a philosophical conclusion of “designed by God” - let alone “designed by the God of a particular religion” - takes us beyond “the design inference” made by the scientific theory of “intelligent design” and into the metaphysical realms of natural theology. I offer a systematic philosophical and empirical defence of “intelligent design theory” in my book *An Informed Cosmos: Essays on Intelligent Design Theory* (Wipf & Stock, 2023).

The combination of philosophical shifts away from verificationism and scientism, combined with the growth of scientific knowledge over recent decades, means that “Natural theology today is practiced with a degree of diversity and confidence unprecedented since the late Middle Ages.”¹¹

3. What is methodological naturalism, and why is it problematic in science?

French philosopher Auguste Compt (1798-1857) insisted that “science” couldn’t make reference to divine action to explain any events or phenomena. Subsequent thinkers have sometimes expanded Compt’s rule to exclude from science reference to any intelligence that might be suspected of being irreducibly mental rather than “natural” (that is, conceivable in metaphysically naturalistic or materialistic terms). Hence the U.S. *National Academy of Science* asserts that: “The statements of science must invoke only natural things and processes.”¹² This “methodologically naturalistic” conception of science remains prevalent amongst scientists, though it is controversial among philosophers of science.¹³ As atheist philosopher of science Bradley Monton argues:

If science really is permanently committed to methodological naturalism, it follows that the aim of science is not generating true theories. Instead, the aim ... would be something like: generating the best theories that can be formulated subject to the restriction that the theories are naturalistic . . . science is better off without being shackled by methodological naturalism . . .¹⁴

Inferring the activity of “intelligence” as the best explanation for empirical data within archaeology, cryptography, forensic science, or the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence, is accepted as a scientific procedure, even if a philosopher might argue – perhaps correctly – that the intelligence in question is best understood in terms of substance dualism. To avoid a double standard, inferring the activity of “intelligence” as the best explanation for empirical data within cosmology and/or biology should likewise be recognised as a scientific procedure, whether the intelligence in question appears to be an immanent extra-terrestrial intelligence, an intelligence the philosopher might explain in terms of a naturalism-busting substance dualism, or a transcendent intelligence best conceptualized in equally naturalism-busting metaphysical terms.¹⁵

4. If an atheist comes to you and says that he only believes in what science has proven, what would you say?

I might well say, with a light-hearted chuckle: “No you don’t!” The person who says he “only believes in what science has proven” undoubtedly holds many beliefs that science has *not* proven, including many beliefs that science couldn’t possibly prove. This comes down to questions about the definition of “science” and the definition of “proof” in our speaker’s assertion, but science as its generally defined in contemporary Western culture makes all sorts of philosophical assumptions that are beyond the purview of science even to address, let alone to prove. Science doesn’t establish logical, mathematical, moral, aesthetic or metaphysical truths, but scientists can’t and don’t do science without holding beliefs about such matters.

5. You write, “Rationality requires faith.” What do you mean by that?

Rationality requires “faith” in the sense of requiring *trust*. It is impossible to argue for the truth of the fundamental principles of reason. Any argument one tried to make for the truth of such principles would be a circular argument that assumed what it set out to demonstrate. In order to reason about anything, then, you have to trust in reason.

Its worth adding that the worldview that seems to make the best sense of our inescapable trust in reason is the theistic worldview, since theism gives reason a home (a coherent ontological location) within the nature of fundamental reality in a way that’s unavailable to worldviews that attempt to build rationality on an a-rational foundation. The mind-first worldview of theism makes better sense of reason than does the matter-first worldview of naturalism,¹⁶ or the distinction denying worldview of pantheism.¹⁷

6. Why do you think the moral argument for God’s existence has been the most discussed?

The *kalam* cosmological argument from the finitude of the cosmic past is probably the “most discussed” theistic argument, at least in the professional philosophical literature. The meta-ethical moral argument for God (to give the full name of what people generally call “the moral argument”) has certainly been quite widely discussed, even though it’s actually a relative newcomer in the field of natural theology that came to prominence in the mid-twentieth century writings of philosophers like Hastings Rashdall, W.R. Sorely, A.E Taylor, and (latterly) H.P. Owen. While I see the *kalam* argument as a variation on the traditional contingency cosmological argument, I think the meta-ethical moral argument holds a particular interest because it speaks to the ethical character of God.

Formal theistic arguments are generally a trade-off between *accessibility* (e.g. brevity, being intuitively convincing, being grounded in common experience) and *robustness* (e.g. explicit logical validity, dependence upon academic knowledge, etc.) I think one reason that the meta-ethical argument for God has achieved a certain popularity amongst philosophers who embrace natural theology is because its connection with the everyday experience of most people makes it relatively accessible.

Many atheists - e.g. Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Kurtz and J.L. Mackie (whose 1977 book *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* was a set text in my undergraduate days) - argue that the existence of God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values, such that the subjectivity (and hence relativity) of morality is entailed (or at least implied) by the truth of atheism. For example, Joel Marks, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of New Haven, explains that his atheism leads him to reject moral objectivism:

the religious fundamentalists are correct: without God, there is no morality. But they are incorrect, I still believe, about there being a God. Hence, I believe, there is no morality . . . In sum, while theists take the obvious existence of moral commands to be a kind of proof of the existence of a Commander, i.e., God, I now take the non-existence of a Commander as a kind of proof that there are no Commands, i.e., morality.¹⁸

Conversely, many theistic philosophers agree with such atheistic colleagues that the existence of God is a prerequisite (or at least the best explanation) for the existence of objective moral values and/or duties, but they use this premise in the service of natural theology by arguing for moral objectivism.

Of course, plenty of atheistic philosophers argue for moral objectivism, while trying to fend off any suggestion that moral objectivism suggests anything positive about the

existence of God.¹⁹ This has the interesting consequence that both premises of the moral argument can be defended by quoting from atheist philosophers. It's just that no atheist could can consistently defend *both* of those premises!

7. Many people think that since we can be wrong about right and wrong, it must mean that objective morality does not exist and that right and wrong vary from person to person. What's wrong with this way of thinking?

If it is a fact that we can be “wrong” in the sense of “intellectually mistaken” about what it is right or wrong to choose to do or refrain from doing, that entails there are objective moral facts about which we can be accurately or inaccurately informed (where “objective moral facts” are things that we discover rather than invent). The fact that what people *believe about* what's morally right and/or wrong varies from person to person no more suggests there are no moral facts than does the fact that what people (including scientists) *believe about* the nature of the physical world varies suggests there is no physical world.

Indeed, since it doesn't make sense to disagree with someone about subjective matters (there's no arguing that someone who claims they subjectively prefer coffee with milk to black coffee is wrong – i.e. incorrect - about their own subjective preference), the fact that we disagree and argue with each other about what is right and/or wrong to do actually suggests there's an objective fact of the matter about which we are disagreeing.

8. You also believe that subjectivism about morality is contradictory. Can you explain that?

To quote philosopher Brian Leftow, “Arguments do not compel our assent. They merely appeal for it.”²⁰ If someone is a moral subjectivist, then can't consistently assume anyone has an objective moral duty to “be reasonable,” that is, to give respectful, serious attention to arguments – *including arguments for moral subjectivism* - such that they are open to acknowledging the force of that argument's appeal for their assent and thus to changing their mind on the basis of that appeal. Yet, in giving arguments for moral subjectivism, the subjectivist appears to make just such an assumption.

9. You've used the Leibnizian cosmological argument, which points out that the universe that exists must have an explanation for its existence and that God is the best explanation for it. Some will then respond, “The universe just is. Either we don't know why, or it happened by necessity without the creation of a god we have never observed.” Why do you think such an answer doesn't make sense?

First of all, note that the issue at hand is not empirical observation but good argumentation. Rational arguments, including arguments within science, cannot be coherently restricted to observable entities.

A Leibnizian type of cosmological argument run as follows:

- 1) Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
- 2) The universe exists.
- 3) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence.
- 4) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is (most plausibly) “God.”
- 5) Therefore, the explanation of the universe's existence is (most plausibly) “God.”

Since the universe obviously exists, non-theists must deny premises 1 or 4 to rationally avoid the conclusion of this argument.

Many philosophers think that Premise 1 – which is a version of the “principle of sufficient reason” - is self-evidently true. Imagine finding a translucent ball on the forest floor whilst hiking. You’d naturally wonder how it came to be there. If a fellow hiker said, “It just exists inexplicably. Don’t worry about it!” you wouldn’t take him seriously. Suppose we increase the size of the ball so it’s as big as the planet. That doesn’t remove the need for explanation. Suppose it were the size of the universe. Same problem.

As for premise 4, this is synonymous with the standard atheistic claim that if God doesn’t exist, then the universe has no explanation of its existence. Given premise 1, the only alternative to explaining the universe by reference to a necessarily existent “God” is to claim the universe has an explanation of its existence *in the necessity of its own nature*. But this would be a *very* radical step (and I can’t think of any contemporary atheistic philosopher who takes it). After all, it appears coherent to imagine the collection of quarks/fields/strings that actually makes up the physical universe being substituted for by a wholly distinct collection of such objects; but such a universe would be a different universe, so universes clearly don’t exist necessarily. Hence, the most plausible explanation of the universe’s existence is the existence of a necessarily existent “God.”

10. Some atheist physicists, such as Lawrence Krauss, argue that the universe may have been created from “nothing,” which he eventually defines as natural laws. Why can’t the laws of nature explain the beginning of the universe?

Krauss’s “nothing” is in fact a physical “something” the behavior of which is described by complex natural laws. However detailed our theoretical scientific description of fundamental physical reality becomes, such scientific description cannot answer the metaphysical question as to why this physical reality exist rather than some other possible physical reality, or why any physical reality should exist rather than none at all.

Considered simply as descriptive statements about the behavior of natural objects left to their own devices, natural “laws” don’t cause anything at all (note that scientific talk about natural “laws” is metaphorical language borrowed from the theological roots of science in the Old Testament). Rather, natural “laws” describe how physical things behave and interact in accordance with their inherent natures. The fundamental question of why they have precisely these natures, and why anything exists at all, are literally metaphysical (i.e. beyond-physics) questions.

Moreover, the coming into existence of a subatomic particle is something physicists describe in terms of a natural change within the physical realm, rather than a case of creation *ex nihilo*. David Albert, an atheist philosopher of physics, makes this point devastatingly clear in his review of Krauss’s book *A Universe From Nothing*, which is worth quoting at some length:

The fundamental laws of nature... have no bearing whatsoever on questions of where the elementary stuff came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular elementary stuff it does, as opposed to something else, or to nothing at all. The fundamental physical laws that Krauss is talking about in *A Universe From Nothing* — the laws of relativistic quantum field theories — are no exception to this. The... elementary physical stuff of the world, according to the standard presentations of relativistic quantum field theories, consists (unsurprisingly) of relativistic quantum fields. And the fundamental laws of this theory... have nothing whatsoever to say on

the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story.... Krauss seems to be thinking that these vacuum states amount to the relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical version of there *not being any physical stuff at all*. And he has an argument — or thinks he does — that the laws of relativistic quantum field theories entail that vacuum states are unstable. And that, in a nutshell, is the account he proposes of why there should be something rather than nothing. But that’s just not right. Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states — no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems — are particular arrangements of *elementary physical stuff*. The true relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn’t this or that particular arrangement of the fields — what it is (obviously, and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple *absence* of the fields! The fact that some arrangements of fields happen to correspond to the existence of particles and some don’t is not a whit more mysterious than the fact that some of the possible arrangements of my fingers happen to correspond to the existence of a fist and some don’t. And the fact that particles can pop in and out of existence, over time, as those fields rearrange themselves, is not a whit more mysterious than the fact that fists can pop in and out of existence, over time, as my fingers rearrange themselves. And none of these poppings . . . amount to anything even remotely in the neighborhood of a creation from nothing.²¹

So, Krauss’s “nothing” is actually a physical and therefore contingent “something,” and the philosophical question as to why that contingent something exists remains.

11. When atheists are challenged that they cannot satisfactorily explain the existence of the universe, they often respond with, “Who created God?,” as if theists have no satisfactory answer. They further claim that there is no fundamental difference between believing in a universe without a creator and believing in a creator without a creator. What is the problem with this way of answering?

Interestingly, as a three-year-old I surprised my mother by stopping in the middle of a road crossing to ask her: “If God made everything, who made God?” She doesn’t remember her response, though it presumably satisfied me enough at the time to get me out of the road! Of course, the answer to my question is that “God” isn’t the sort of thing that needs to be made to exist by a cause outside of itself. On the contrary, “God” designates the unmade maker of all reality besides God. This *not* an exception to the logic of causality designed to smuggle God into the picture, but is both part-and-parcel of the traditional monotheistic concept of what’s meant by “God,” and a conclusion forced upon us by the logic of causality.

Suppose I ask you to loan me a certain book, but you say: “I don’t have a copy right now, but I’ll ask my friend to lend me his copy and then I’ll lend it to you.” Suppose your friend says the same thing to you, and so on. Two things are clear. First, if the process of asking to borrow the book goes on *ad infinitum*, I’ll never get the book. Second, if I get the book, the process that led to me getting it can’t have gone on *ad infinitum*. Somewhere down the line of requests to borrow the book, someone *had* the book *without having to borrow it*. Likewise, argues Richard Purtill, consider any contingent (e.g. physical) reality that receives its existence from outside of itself:

the same two principles apply. If the process of everything getting its existence from something else went on to infinity, then the thing in question would never [have] existence. And if the thing has . . . existence then the process hasn't gone on to infinity. There was something that had existence without having to receive it from something else

...²²

It is impossible for everything to be the sort of thing that needs to be caused to exist by something outside of itself. On the assumption that *everything* requires an external cause of its existence, since a thing must exist in order to cause anything, and since there is nothing outside of *everything*, it follows that nothing would exist. But something does exist. Therefore, it is not the case that everything requires an external cause, and that means there is something that exists without requiring an external cause of its existence. And, to quote Thomas Aquinas, "this we call God;" especially when we consider this particular argument in the context of the overall cumulative case for theism. We cannot equate the universe with "God" because the universe is a physical reality, and physical realities are contingent. As philosopher Dallas Willard argued:

the dependent character of all physical states, together with the completeness of the series of dependencies underlying the existence of any given physical state, logically implies at least one self-existent, and therefore nonphysical, state of being.²³

A self-existent being explaining all of physical reality can't be a physical reality (since then it would have to be explanatorily prior to itself, which is impossible). The only remaining possibilities are an abstract object or an immaterial mind. But abstract objects (even granting their existence) are by definition causally impotent. Therefore, the explanation of the physical universe is a "self-existent, and therefore nonphysical" Creative Mind.

Some might be tempted to think the need a "self-existent, and therefore nonphysical" Creative Mind (i.e. "God") can be avoided by postulating that the causal regress behind the existence of any particular contingent thing is actually infinite (i.e. that "everything" is "A collection of definite and discrete members whose number is greater than any natural number"²⁴). Indeed, the denial that anything has necessary existence combines with the acknowledgement that something exists to entail the existence of an actually infinite causal regress. But why think the postulate of an actually infinite causal regress does any useful explanatory work? Each supposed member of such an actually infinite series of contingent things is *a thing that cannot exist unless it is caused to exist by a previous member of the series that actually exists*, for only existing things can cause anything. However, *no* member of such a series can actually exist in order to cause any other member of the series to exist *unless it is caused to exist by a previous member of the series that actually exists*. Each member of this hypothetically infinite causal series is in just as much of an existential bind as any and all of the others. As Bruce R. Reichenbach argues:

Suppose we have an infinite series, such that *a* is caused by *b*, which in turn and at the same time is caused by *c* . . . and so on to infinity. The series is actually infinite, and each cause is in a transitive causal relation to another cause . . . since the series continues indefinitely, the explanation of *a* is deferred indefinitely. Consequently, this type of series can never yield any sufficient reason for the existence of *a* . . . the explanation is continually being deferred.²⁵

W. David Beck illustrates Reichenbach's point by analogy with explaining the motion of a boxcar in a train:

It is tempting to settle the problem of ultimate causal explanation by noting that each boxcar is being pulled by the one in front of it. But this is where transitivity becomes crucial. It may well be true that boxcar A is pulled by boxcar B. But B can pull A only because B is being pulled by C. The pulling action of B is transitive. It occurs only because B is, in turn, pulled by C. And so it is also true that A is being pulled by C. And C, and therefore A, is pulled by D, and so on An infinity of boxcars will still leave unsolved the problem of explaining why the first boxcar is moving and hence why any are. The problem is not with the arrangement of boxcars, nor is it a matter of the number of boxcars. The problem is that no boxcar in the chain has the capacity to generate or initiate its own motion. It can pass on the pulling, but it does not initiate it. Likewise, the problem with everything we know of in the universe is its contingency. The supposition that the causal nexus is constituted by infinitely many contingent objects fails to be an ultimate explanation for the existence of any individual object in the nexus. There has been no full accounting for the existence of even the first item of the sequence currently under observation.²⁶

If reason suggests we shouldn't believe in the existence or explanatory sufficiency of an actually infinite regress of contingent causes, then reason suggests both that the "who made God" question is malformed and that we have good reason to believe in "God."

English Christian philosopher Peter S. Williams (MA, MPhil, PGCert) has been thinking about the existence of God for nearly half a century. Natural theology has been a central theme in his work, and he has publicly debated God's existence with philosophers including Einar Duenger Bøhn, A.C. Grayling, Michael Martin and Christopher Norris. For more about Peter, see www.peterswilliams.com. For details on and resources relating to his book *A Universe From Someone: Essays on Natural Theology* (Wipf & Stock, 2022), see: www.peterswilliams.com/publications/books/a-universe-from-someone-essays-on-natural-theology/

¹ Alvin Plantinga, "Two Dozen (Or So) Arguments for God."

<https://appearedtoblogly.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/plantinga-alvin-22two-dozen-or-so-theistic-arguments221.pdf>.

² See: Peter S. Williams, "Arguments For and From Fulfilled Biblical Prophecies"

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ij47Yar22iU&t=5009s>; Peter S. Williams, *Understanding Jesus: Five Ways to Spiritual Enlightenment* (Paternoster, 2011).

³ See: Peter S. Williams, "Getting at Jesus: A Critique of Neo-Atheist Nonsense About the Jesus of History"

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3G9FPhnmJs&t=1790s>; Peter S. Williams, "Defending Early High Christology with Archaeology and New Testament Letters" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vUha7-4Puy8&t=2568s>; Peter S. Williams, *Getting at Jesus: A Comprehensive Critique of Neo-Atheist Nonsense about the Jesus of History* (Wipf & Stock, 2019); Peter S. Williams, *Behold the Man: Essays on the Historical Jesus* (Wipf & Stock, 2024).

⁴ See: Peter S. Williams, "Getting At The Resurrection." (2020) <http://podcast.peterswilliams.com/e/getting-at-jesus-getting-at-the-resurrection/>; Peter S. Williams, *Getting at Jesus: A Comprehensive Critique of Neo-Atheist Nonsense about the Jesus of History* (Wipf & Stock, 2019); Peter S. Williams, *Behold the Man: Essays on the Historical Jesus* (Wipf & Stock, 2024).

⁵ Thomas Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos* (OUP, 2012), p. 127.

⁶ See: William Lane Craig & J.P. Moreland, *Naturalism: A Critical Analysis* (Routledge, 2000); Stephen E. Parrish, *Atheism? A Critical Analysis* (Wipf & Stock, 2019).

⁷ See: Peter S. Williams, "'Imagine Naturalism' - C.S Lewis' Atheism and His Escape From the Closed Universe" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H74iTqdQa7w&t=1s>; Peter S. Williams, "Can We Believe in God in an Age of Science? Are Humans Merely Material?" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Guusfwopwk>; Peter S. Williams, *Behold the Man: Essays on the Historical Jesus* (Wipf & Stock, 2024); Peter S. Williams, *A Faithful Guide to Philosophy: A Christian Introduction to the Love of Wisdom* (Wipf & Stock, 2019).

⁸ Mortimer J. Adler, *Great Books of the Western World* (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 561.

-
- ⁹ William Lane Craig, “God Is Not Dead Yet” <https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/existence-natureof-god/god-is-not-dead-yet>.
- ¹⁰ See: Peter S. Williams, “Can We Believe in God in an Age of Science? The Big Bang & Cosmic 'Fine Tuning'” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZvRygHVHwU>; Peter S. Williams, “Can We Believe in God in an Age of Science? Darwinism and Intelligent Design” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7bqFzK-cXY>; Peter S. Williams, *An Informed Cosmos: Essays on Intelligent Design Theory* (Wipf & Stock, 2023).
- ¹¹ James Brent, “Natural Theology” <https://iep.utm.edu/theo-nat/>.
- ¹² *Teaching about Evolution and the Nature of Science*, p. 2.
- ¹³ See: Peter S. Williams, “Can We Believe in God in an Age of Science? Debunking the 'Conflict Thesis'” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Alf0g33K_iQ; Peter S. Williams, *An Informed Cosmos: Essays on Intelligent Design Theory* (Wipf & Stock, 2023).
- ¹⁴ Bradley Monton, “Is Intelligent Design Science? Dissecting the Dover Decision” p. 2 & 9-10, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002592/01/Methodological_Naturalism_Dover_3.doc.
- ¹⁵ See: Peter S. Williams, *An Informed Cosmos: Essays on Intelligent Design Theory* (Wipf & Stock, 2023).
- ¹⁶ See: Peter S. Williams, *A Faithful Guide to Philosophy: A Christian Introduction to the Love of Wisdom* (Wipf & Stock, 2019).
- ¹⁷ See: Peter S. Williams, *Behold the Man: Essays on the Historical Jesus* (Wipf & Stock, 2024).
- ¹⁸ Joel Marks, “An Amoral Manifesto: Part I” in *Philosophy Now* (80):30-33 (2010).
- ¹⁹ See: Peter S. Williams, “Can Moral Objectivism Do Without God?” <https://www.bethinking.org/morality/can-moral-objectivism-do-without-god>.
- ²⁰ Brian Leftow in Roy Abraham Varghese, ed. *Great Thinkers on Great Questions* (OneWorld, 1998).
- ²¹ David Albert, “On the Origin of Everything” <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/a-universe-from-nothing-by-lawrence-m-krauss.html>.
- ²² Richard Purtill quoted by Charles Taliaferro, *Contemporary Philosophy of Religion* (John Wiley & Sons, 1998), p. 358-359.
- ²³ Dallas Willard, “Language, Being, God, and the Three Stages of Theistic Evidence.” <https://dwillard.org/articles/language-being-god-and-the-three-stages-of-theistic-evidence>.
- ²⁴ <https://beliefmap.org/infinity/impossible/paradoxes>.
- ²⁵ Bruce R. Reichenbach, *The Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment* (Charles C. Thomas, 1972), p. 16-17.
- ²⁶ W. David Beck, “God’s Existence.” https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=sor_fac_pubs.

Filename: BioCosmos_Interview_March2025.docx
Folder: /Users/peterwilliams/Library/Containers/com.microsoft.Word/Data/Documents
Template: /Users/peterwilliams/Library/Group Containers/UBF8T346G9.Office/User Content.localized/Templates.localized/Normal.dotm
Title:
Subject:
Author: Peter Williams
Keywords:
Comments:
Creation Date: 3/25/25 4:28:00 PM
Change Number: 2
Last Saved On: 3/25/25 4:28:00 PM
Last Saved By: Peter Williams
Total Editing Time: 0 Minutes
Last Printed On: 3/25/25 4:28:00 PM
As of Last Complete Printing
Number of Pages: 10
Number of Words: 5,475
Number of Characters: 32,023 (approx.)